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STRATEGY OR NECESSITY FOR FINLAND?
• Climate change will have security effects, both directly in the form of natural disasters and 
indirectly through societal upheavals. In the international arena, some of these have already been 
recognized by political leaders.
• In Finland, climate security has not emerged as a major policy issue. This may be due in part to the 
fact that the relatively weak ecological impacts predicted for Northern Europe do not amount to a 
significant sense of threat.
• Yet the effects of climate change will be felt globally and will also pose indirect security threats. 
Therefore, Finland has a responsibility and an interest to develop its own climate security 
policies and participate in international cooperation in this field, with the aim of managing the 
phenomenon.
• The securitization of climate change will not be beneficial or effective if it is only seen in terms 
of an imposition of traditional security practices onto climate policies. Instead, climate security 
discussion and policy should be based on participation and pre-emption rather than on extreme 
measures and emergency.
• Concrete policies need to be developed to tackle climate security. Finland should contribute to 
this effort both at the national and the global level, focusing on areas of its own expertise such 
as science and technology, regional and multilateral cooperation, peace-building, or the Arctic 
region.
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Introduction
Climate change is morphing from a dark cloud into 
a full-blown storm in the firmament of security 
threats. As scientific research has repeatedly been 
able to show the link between the global change in 
temperatures and extreme weather events already 
taking place, the urgency of preventive measures is 
becoming increasingly clear.
Globally, some steps have been taken to acknowl-
edge the emerging security risk. President Barack 
Obama has maintained that the issue is the greatest 
long-term threat facing the world, and recently 
redoubled his efforts to fight against it as the greatest 
legacy of his presidency. Meanwhile, the US military 
has already taken climate change into account in its 
risk assessments for some years, and is now calling 
it a ‘threat multiplier’. The security implications 
were also highlighted in the fifth assessment of the 
International Panel on Climate Change,1 and by the 
UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) with various 
issues such as conflict.2
In Finland, however, climate change has been slow 
to emerge as a security issue. It has primarily been 
seen as a part of global politics and relegated to the 
level of EU policy-making. Some specific issues, 
such as climate change in the Arctic region, have 
raised questions about potential security threats. Yet 
in practice, these concerns tend to be undermined 
by economic interests.
This paper will consider climate security as a politi-
cal problem from the Finnish point of view. It will 
first discuss the ways in which climate change 
has been taken into account as a security issue 
elsewhere and contrast this with the situation in 
Finland. In addition, it will reflect upon the diffi-
culties of linking climate to the security discourse, 
suggesting that it is not sufficient to simply apply 
security language and policies to a new set of prob-
lems. The paper will go on to argue that inaction on 
1  IPCC (2014). Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contri-
bution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge and New York.
2  UNEP (2011). Livelihood Security: Climate change, conflict 
and migration in the Sahel. UNEP, Geneva.
climate security is not a viable long-term strategy 
for Finland as the security threats and the policies 
to address them become more acute. Finally, it will 
propose measures to combine input from natural 
and social sciences as well as policy-making to for-
mulate concrete climate security policies.
Conflict links and disaster risks – climate 
security topics in Finland and elsewhere
The effects of climate change are usually presented 
through rather straightforward predictions, such as 
a rise in the global average temperature of about 2 
degrees Celsius over the next century. While these 
arguments sound alarming, they may also create a 
sense that climate change will only be actualized in 
the distant future. This is a misleading interpreta-
tion, as any temperature rise will obviously not 
take place overnight but as a progressively creeping 
development.
This false sense of security has been shaken to some 
extent by extreme weather events like hurricanes 
and heatwaves. While these are by no means a new 
occurrence, scientists have traced some of their 
increasing frequency to the global temperature 
rise. Extreme weather also appears to increase 
public awareness of and, consequently, concern 
about climate change. So far, however, research 
has struggled to effectively communicate the link-
age between an extreme weather event and general 
climate change.3
Conversely, the range of topics linked to climate 
security continues to grow. Extreme weather 
threatens human lives and health directly, but it 
also poses risks to vital infrastructure like energy 
networks and water management. A rise in the 
sea level will concretely threaten the existence of 
small island developing states such as Kiribati and 
the Maldives, but coastal areas all over the world 
are at risk as well. Human security will deteriorate 
as resource scarcities like crop failure and water 
shortages will potentially affect over a billion people 
around the world.
3  Antal, M., & Hukkinen, J. I. (2010). “The art of the cognitive 
war to save the planet.” Ecological economics, 69(5), 937–
943.
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Such problems will have societal and economic 
ramifications that may shake socio-political struc-
tures and give rise to instability. Through this link-
age, climate change may, in combination with other 
factors, contribute to the creation or continuation 
of conflicts. Furthermore, climate impacts will par-
ticularly affect developing countries with societies 
and populations that are vulnerable to environmen-
tal and political risks. This is likely to accentuate 
inequalities between the Global South and North and 
have several destabilizing effects. Increased migra-
tion is predicted to be one consequence, although 
estimates vary considerably concerning the size and 
direction of the migrant flows.4
As knowledge about the worrying future prospects 
accumulates, the climate threat has risen onto the 
international agenda and has increasingly come to 
be seen as a security issue. In the run-up to the Paris 
Agreement on climate change, reached in December 
2015, Barack Obama was joined by the likes of Kofi 
Annan in calling for urgent global action precisely 
because of the security threats. Climate change 
also features strongly in the EU’s Global Strategy 
for Foreign and Security Policy. The UN Security 
Council (UNSC) has discussed the issue several times, 
although it has not been able to reach a consensus 
on ways to address the topic.5 Although the result of 
the recent presidential election in the US is likely to 
change the setting in global climate politics to some 
extent, the security aspects have gained enough 
prominence not to be swept under the carpet in the 
new situation.
For its part, the EU may not have featured in the cli-
mate security discussion as prominently to outside 
observers as the US, but the issue has gained rel-
evance within its institutions. Among other things, 
climate security is featured within the foreign policy 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 
4  IOM (2008). Migration and Climate Change. IOM Migra-
tion Research Series 31. Available at http://www.iisd.org/
pdf/2008/migration_climate.pdf. Last accessed 22 Nov 2016.
5  Warren, D. (2015). Possible Roles for the UN Security Coun-
cil in Addressing Climate Change. Sabin Center for Climate 
Change Law, Columbia Law School; available at https://web.
law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-
change/warren_-_cc_and_international_peace_and_se-
curity_-_roles_for_the_un_security_council.pdf. Last 
accessed 22 Nov 2016.
and has been taken into account in early warning 
mechanisms, thus integrating it as an element in 
disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention.6 
Such operationalization of the issue may well be 
more important in terms of impact than high-level 
declarations.
The scale of attention inevitably raises some ques-
tions about its consequences. In international rela-
tions theory, the linkage of climate to security has 
been studied as ‘securitization’, in which security is 
constructed as an inter-subjective process brought 
about by the presence of an existential threat. This 
analytical approach enables an examination of the 
aims of the actors involved and the outcomes of 
the process itself. The original securitization theory 
cautioned against the excessive securitization of 
new issues, arguing that it may be harmful as it 
moves them beyond the normal democratic proce-
dure into a sphere of emergency decision-making.7 
However, other scholars have since challenged this, 
proposing that the security sector is inevitably faced 
with new challenges and therefore needs to adopt 
new practices to come to terms with them. Rather 
than the security sector taking over climate issues, 
this may instead result in a kind of ‘climatization’ 
of security.8
This multifarious discussion on climate security is 
in contrast with that taking place in Finland, where 
the theme remains marginal. Key documents like 
the white papers on Finnish Foreign and Security 
Policy as well as the Security and Defence Policy 
both acknowledge climate change as a factor affect-
ing the security situation, but do not propose con-
crete steps to address it. Rather, the issue is seen to 
fall under EU foreign policy or development policy. 
6  Zwolski, K., & Kaunert, C. (2011). “The EU and climate secu-
rity: a case of successful norm entrepreneurship?” European 
security, 20(1), 21–43.
7  Buzan, B. et al. (1998). Security. A New Framework for 
Analysis. Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London.
8  Oels, A. (2012). “From ‘securitization’ of climate change to 
‘climatization’ of the security field: comparing three theoret-
ical perspectives.” In Climate change, human security and 
violent conflict (pp. 185–205). Springer Berlin Heidelberg; 
Trombetta, M. J. (2008). “Environmental security and cli-
mate change: analysing the discourse.” Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 21(4), 585–602.
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Yet Finland has not been active on the topic in the 
EU context either.
This may be due to the fact that in all predictions, 
Finland is foreseen to experience only moderate 
climate change impacts. A slight increase in the fre-
quency of heavy rainfall or flooding may be unfor-
tunate, but pales in comparison to the catastrophic 
scenarios that have urged action in other countries.
Yet the relative safety is no excuse for inaction; quite 
the contrary, in fact. First, Finland is by no means 
isolated from the ramifications of the global climate 
impacts, be they physical or political. Food crises, 
migration or geopolitics will not stop at the Finnish 
borders, and therefore need to be taken into account 
in our own security policy. Meanwhile, the EU has 
been diagnosed as seriously vulnerable to climate 
impacts in its near abroad, especially the Mediter-
ranean and Middle East regions.
Second, Finland does have some specific climate-
related risks within its borders that have not been 
adequately considered. The Arctic region is a crucial 
case as it is projected to endure an even larger rise 
in temperatures than the rest of the world. The 
development will dramatically change the regional 
environment but also enable the extraction of new 
deposits of natural resources, including oil.9 As a 
result, the Arctic has become a focus of geopoliti-
cal and security interests at an international level. 
While Finland has officially expressed concern about 
environmental security in the region, it is also hop-
ing to benefit from the economic opportunities 
brought about by climate change, thus potentially 
further aggravating the risks. This contradictory 
approach appears to be emblematic of Finland’s 
climate security policy so far.
Third, the security implications of climate change 
form an emerging policy discourse that will heat 
up along with the global temperature. As the cli-
mate impacts become more acute, the measures 
to prevent and contain them will need to become 
9  Käpylä, J., & Mikkola, H. (2016). “The promise of the geoeco-
nomic Arctic: a critical analysis.” Asia Europe Journal, 14(2), 
203-220; Gritsenko D (2017). “Arctic energy: Resource colo-
nialism revisited.” In Kuzemko C., Goldthau A., Keating M. 
(eds.) Handbook of International Political Economy of Ener-
gy and Natural Resources. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
increasingly urgent. This may lead to emergency 
politics that will not necessarily produce demo-
cratic, let alone the most economical or efficient 
solutions to deal with climate threats. Finland could 
anticipate this by taking on an active role in formu-
lating climate security policies, rather than merely 
passively adopting them. The logical context for this 
is the EU climate security policy, which gives the 
issue a far wider global relevance.
Securitization of climate change as policy and politics
In spite of the increasing necessity of discussing the 
security implications of climate change, the climate 
security approach does not provide easy solutions. 
As mentioned above, securitization has also been 
seen as harmful, even in the original theory itself. 
On the other hand, the current debate has perhaps 
been excessively technical, neglecting the political 
and societal consequences that a security perspec-
tive could and should illuminate. The key, therefore, 
is not to arbitrarily impose security onto the climate 
agenda, but rather to develop the kind of security 
practices that help to address the threats.
Yet in scholarly debate, there has been a tendency 
to see climate security as an attempt to reduce the 
discourse to just one perspective. This is evident, 
for example, in the debate about the potential of 
climate change to cause conflicts. Some scholars 
argue that the ‘climate-conflict nexus’ is futile as 
various studies show that climate conditions alone 
do not explain conflict occurrence; instead, there 
are always societal and political factors at play as 
well.10 Others, however, point out that this does 
not diminish the relevance of climate as a factor 
that increases vulnerability. This not only makes it a 
threat multiplier, but also suggests that it would be 
beneficial to take the changing climate into account 
in peacebuilding operations.11
Meanwhile, predictions about climate migration 
have been challenged on the grounds that the 
10  Raleigh, C., Linke, A., & O’Loughlin, J. (2014). “Extreme 
temperatures and violence.” Nature Climate Change, 4(2), 
76–77.
11  Gemenne, F. et al. (2014). “Climate and security: Evidence, 
emerging risks, and a new agenda.” Climatic Change, 123(1), 
1–9.
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security narrative they produce is based on shielding 
the Global North from the threat posed by migrants, 
who are simultaneously reduced to a victim status.12 
Such an approach is not conducive to either solving 
the migrant crisis or preventing climate change. Yet 
at the same time, a complete rejection of a linkage 
between climate and migration and its possible 
security implications could leave important interac-
tions unexplored. In the light of current scientific 
assessments, climate refugees do not appear as 
‘apocalyptic narratives’, but as one important and 
likely outcome of climate change.
The securitization of climate has also been associ-
ated with a shift in the discussion towards adapta-
tion as opposed to mitigation; that is, attempting 
to prepare for coping with climate impacts rather 
than preventing them. Adaptation measures usually 
aim to strengthen community capacity at the local 
level, for example by strengthening natural buffers 
in vulnerable ecosystems or improving the sustain-
ability of farmland management. Such efforts reflect 
an increasing understanding that climate change 
cannot be fully reversed, making it a high prior-
ity to minimize its effects. However, an excessive 
emphasis on adaptation may indeed run the risk of 
neglecting mitigation, which should still be seen as 
the long-term imperative.
This is particularly distressing with regard to the 
issue of ‘tipping points’, raised by climate scientists 
to describe thresholds beyond which climate change 
will trigger irreversible impacts on entire ecosys-
tems, such as the melting of Polar ice caps or the 
permafrost.13 In these cases, adaptation is virtually 
impossible and mitigation is the key. Tipping points 
present existential threats and therefore quite obvi-
ously pose security questions. However, they also 
show that climate security has to go beyond point-
ing out threats towards actually formulating policies 
to counter them. Yet it is not enough to merely point 
out that the sea level is rising or coral reefs dying, 
12  Bettini, G. (2013). “Climate barbarians at the gate? A critique 
of apocalyptic narratives on ‘climate refugees’.” Geoforum, 
45, 63–72.
13  Hansen J. (2008). “Tipping point: Perspective of a clima-
tologist.” In Fearn, E. (Ed.) The State of the Wild: A Global 
Portrait of Wildlife, Wild Lands, and Oceans. Wildlife Con-
servation Society/Island Press, Washington, D.C., 6–15.
thus adding to a sense of emergency that may give 
rise to hasty and short-sighted policies.
It is therefore clear that climate security goes well 
beyond a mere militarization of climate change. To 
be able to tackle challenges as varied as migration 
or rising sea levels, climate security policies have to 
work through diverse approaches like human secu-
rity, vulnerability and ecological risk. Questions of 
justice and equality feature strongly in this discus-
sion, particularly because of the uneven division 
of climate impacts between the Global North and 
South. Thus, instead of limiting the climate change 
discussion, the security approach has the potential 
to highlight the cross-sectoral implications of the 
interactions involved.
Indeed, in many cases, such as the tipping points, 
the security consequences of climate change are so 
obvious that a failure to consider them could have 
the effect of restricting democratic discussion rather 
than vice versa. Rather than reject the security link-
age, therefore, it is necessary to recognize its politi-
cal implications while acknowledging that these can 
either be useful, such as highlighting the urgency 
to act cooperatively to prevent climate change, or 
deleterious, for example by excessively directing 
the discussion towards military solutions. This also 
means that climate security issues need to be con-
sidered on the basis of each specific case.
Hence, the focus should be on developing useful 
practices to tackle climate security in different 
fields, such as humanitarian relief or peacebuilding. 
Whether this is seen as a ‘climatization’ of security 
or the emergence of a new field within the sector, it 
does reflect the need for a new kind of security logic 
to deal with new kinds of security threats.
Closing the gaps between science, security and policy
The major question is how to translate the recog-
nition of climate change as a security issue into a 
coherent and effective policy without resorting 
to interpretations that might do more harm than 
good. This consideration needs to take place at the 
international level, as an integral part of climate 
diplomacy, development policy and other relevant 
fields, but also as a matter of national governance. 
Finland would benefit from contributing to this 
emerging policy discussion at all levels.
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At the moment, climate security appears to be 
plagued by a degree of discrepancy caused by the 
inability of natural sciences, social sciences and pol-
icy-makers to thoroughly understand one another. 
This easily leads to simplifications that discourage 
and, in the worst case, misinform policy-making. 
Better communication between these key fields is 
therefore necessary, such as in the case of conveying 
the relationship of extreme weather events to cli-
mate change as a whole. Finland, as a country with 
solid expertise in climate sciences, could contribute 
by facilitating interdisciplinary dialogue as well as 
exchanges with policy-makers. This effort should 
also have the aim of formulating a climate security 
policy for Finland and informing the discussion at 
the international level.
Cooperative solutions combining climate science 
with policy are required for ecological phenomena 
like the tipping points, but also for societal issues 
like migration, food security and water supply. 
However, they also need to be streamlined into 
policies at the sectoral level in order to strengthen 
their functionality to be employed as practices. 
Throughout all of this, climate security should 
focus on participation and pre-emption rather than 
extreme measures and emergency.
For one thing, Finland should thoroughly evalu-
ate the ways in which climate change will affect 
its security status, not only in terms of extreme 
weather and other environmental events, but also 
with regard to geopolitics, energy supply, inter-
national commitments and other relevant points 
of view. The outcomes of these evaluations should 
be used to develop concrete measures to address 
the potential threats. However, even if the security 
linkage is duly made, it does not mean that all the 
resulting policies have to be limited to the security 
sector.
In terms of Finnish national interest, an obvious 
and acute climate security case is that of the Arctic. 
Finnish policy should aim to consider the climate 
security of the region as a coherent whole com-
prising the environment, geopolitics, economics, 
justice and other issues. In particular, it should 
take into account the potential controversies that 
arise when short-term economic gains and long-
term security interests end up at odds. Moreover, 
in spite of being a small country, Finland should 
take a regional and global perspective. Tackling 
climate threats unilaterally is impossible, which 
necessitates gaining leverage through the EU level 
and international cooperation. By actively partici-
pating in the policy-making, Finland could be in a 
position to influence climate security policy well 
beyond its relative size, especially in fields where 
it has particular competencies. As a well-known 
actor in peacebuilding, Finland could focus efforts 
on promoting the incorporation of climate security 
into conflict-prevention and stability policies. The 
EU has already linked climate security to its peace-
building operations, which gives it an additional 
channel for influence.
As climate change advances, security threats will 
grow and new ones will emerge. The precise impacts 
of these developments are extremely difficult to pre-
dict, yet ignoring them will hardly make them dis-
appear. The challenge is to come up with solutions 
that will, regardless of the problem of incomplete 
knowledge, be helpful in fighting climate change 
and that won’t create new problems. As this paper 
has argued, Finland has both a responsibility and an 
interest to participate in this work. The sooner this 
commitment is undertaken, the better, as climate 
change won’t wait.
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